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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which mothers that care for children where the 
father is non-resident have an award or agreement for child support in place. Data 
from the Families and Children Study are used to explore not only whether mothers 
have an award or order but the type of award they have. Results show that mothers 
without awards are significantly disadvantaged. Moreover, awards were less 
commonplace where there were fewer children, where mothers claimed Income 
Support, were from an Asian background and where contact between the non-resident 
father and his children was infrequent. Private agreements, in contrast to a CSA award 
or no award, were more likely where mothers had recently separated, when there was 
frequent contact between the non-resident father and his children, and where children 
were younger; they were less common among those living in social housing. 
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Introduction 
By 2004, approximately 3 million children in the United Kingdom were living in a 
lone parent family (Office for National Statistics, 2005). This equated to about one 
quarter of all dependent children, up from less than ten per cent in the early 1970s. 
Moreover, in 2004 there were a further seven hundred thousand UK families – one in 
ten of all families - containing step-children. One of the most significant policy 
responses to this change in family life has been the attempt to compel non-resident 
parents to support their children financially. The Child Support Agency (CSA) 
currently represents the government’s main policy mechanism through which this goal 
is to be achieved. The Agency was established initially as a response to the high rates 
of benefit dependency among parents with care1 with the result that tax payers rather 
than non-resident parents were supporting large numbers of children financially. 
 
In order for a parent with care to receive regular, formalised child support payments, 
they must first have an agreement, order or award for child support in place. In the UK 
there are a variety of routes through which a parent with care might obtain an award2. 
The parent with care and the non-resident parent are free to establish a private 
agreement. Parents may also use the CSA to establish an award as a ‘private case’. 
However, parents with care are currently expected to use the Agency where they claim 
means tested out-of-work benefits such as Income Support3. Court orders post-1993 
are generally small in number and typically part of a post-divorce settlement package. 
At its inception the CSA effectively took over the role of the courts. As a result, 
awards arrived at via the courts post-1993 are considered private agreements (see 
Marsh and Rowlingson 2002)4. Finally, if a parent with care submits a claim for 
means-tested benefit but already has a private agreement or court order, she is still 
expected at present to pursue an award through the CSA, regardless of existing 
arrangements. 
 
To date little detailed evidence exists in the UK as to the factors associated with 
whether a parent with care has an award or not, and the types of child support 
arrangements parents have. This gap in the evidence base has come about mainly due 
to a lack of available data to study awards. One data source that does provide 
                                              
1  The term ‘parent with care’ refers to a parent (natural or adoptive) living with a child 
or children where the child or children’s other parent is resident elsewhere. 
2  Throughout this paper the term ‘award’ is used to refer to court orders, CSA awards 
and private agreements collectively. 
3  Parents claiming means tested benefits who refuse to comply with the Agency face a 
reduction in their Income Support payments unless they can show ‘good cause’ for 
not pursuing a claim through the Agency. 
4  Previous UK studies have generally referred to such agreements as ‘voluntary’ rather 
than ‘private’.  
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information on whether an award has been obtained and the type of award is the 
Families and Children Study or FACS, details of which are described below.  
 
This paper is divided in four parts. First, a brief history of recent developments in UK 
child support policy is provided, specifically reforms to the CSA. This is followed by 
an overview of the British and US literature examining award status. FACS data are 
then used to consider award status in Great Britain; first examining simple descriptive 
statistics and then moving on to describe results from a series of multivariate 
regression models. Finally, some conclusions and implications are discussed. 
 
A more detailed understanding of the processes leading to the establishment of awards 
for child support is important for two reasons. First, obtaining an award is a crucial 
first step in the process of securing child support payments for mothers and the 
potential benefits in poverty reduction and work incentives such payments bring. 
Second, both the Henshaw Redesign report and the recent child support reform White 
Paper set out a framework for the future placing great emphasis on encouraging 
private maintenance arrangements along with the end of compulsion. As a result, it is 
important to consider what factors might be related to the establishment of private 
agreements and how these relationships might differ in the case of other arrangements. 
Despite the fact that the data analysed here come from the pre-Henshaw/White Paper 
reform period, such an analysis may provide insights as to the implications of these 
proposals. 
 
Recent history of child support arrangements in the UK 
Despite the existence of a large number of private agreements to pay child support it is 
the operation of the CSA which has remained the focus of attention in the UK. The 
previous Conservative government established the Agency with the aim of shifting the 
burden of supporting lone parents and their children from the state to the non-resident 
parent thereby reinforcing parental responsibility. More recently under New Labour, 
the CSA has come to be seen as an element in the Government’s anti-poverty strategy. 
 
The Agency commenced operation in 1993 having been established by the 1991 Child 
Support Act. Unfortunately, the operation of the Agency over the 1990s appeared to 
make little difference to the proportion of lone mothers receiving child support 
payments, which remained at around 30 per cent5 over the period. Moreover, the 
                                              
5  It is important to point out that estimates of the proportion of parents with care in 
receipt of child support are based on responses to survey questions. Since the Child 
Support Agency came into being, it has become increasingly difficult for some survey 
respondents, particularly those receiving Income Support, to know whether payments 
are being made or not (Marsh and Perry, 2003). This is because child support 
payments under the original child support rules were deducted pound for pound in any 
assessment of Income Support entitlement. This meant that any maintenance being 
paid to a mother claiming Income Support went directly to the government and 
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Agency has not paid for itself. In 2004/5, the net costs of the CSA stood at around 
£200 million (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006b). For these and other reasons 
the Agency came under sustained criticism and has remained controversial, attracting 
a large amount of negative coverage in the media. 
 
One enduring criticism of the Agency has been that its processes and procedures are 
too complex, difficult to understand and therefore to administer. Partly in response to 
this, the New Labour Government set about reforming both aspects of the policy and 
the organisation of the Agency itself. The 2000 Child Support, Pensions and Social 
Security Act, aimed to reform the Agency primarily through addressing the problem 
of complexity. Furthermore, the Agency’s efforts were not just to focus on offsetting 
costs to the taxpayer but also on alleviating child poverty. 
 
The reforms comprised a significantly simplified formula for calculating the amount 
of support due. Moreover, a disregard of £10 for lone parents on Income Support 
known as the Child Maintenance Premium6 was introduced. The reforms aimed to 
speed up the assessment of child support claims and also tighten enforcement 
procedures (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2004). Furthermore, 
additional sanctions had already been introduced such as deduction from earnings 
orders (DEOs) with non-compliance becoming an offence from January 2000. 
Unfortunately, due to problems implementing a new IT system many of the changes 
were not finally introduced until 2003 (Ridge, 2003). 
 
Despite these reforms, patience with the CSA was wearing thin. By 2004 the House of 
Commons Work and Pensions Committee was describing the Agency as ‘a failing 
organisation…….currently in crisis’ (House of Commons Work and Pensions 
Committee, 2004: 3). As already noted, the problems centred on difficulties 
implementing the CS2 IT system but also on a perceived inability to enforce the 
collection of outstanding payments and a general sense that the Agency was 
encumbered with a legacy of operational difficulties. The Agency’s most recent 
response to its perceived short-comings is the Operational Improvement Plan (OIP) 
launched at the start of 2006 (Child Support Agency, 2006). However, at about the 
same time the Government finally decided to ‘call time’ on the Agency. In a statement 
to the House of Commons, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions John Hutton 
described both the Agency and the policy it represents as ‘not fit for purpose’. 
Moreover, the Secretary of State appointed Sir David Henshaw to completely redesign 
the UK’s system of child support (Hansard 2006: 9 February 2006, column 1021). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
therefore in many cases parents with care were unaware as to whether they were 
technically in receipt or not.  
6  Since 1997, the Child Maintenance Bonus has also been introduced for parents with 
care receiving maintenance payments but on Income Support. A one off bonus of up 
to £1000 is payable on leaving Income Support for work, introduced to further 
strengthen work incentives. 
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Sir David Henshaw’s recommendations (Department for Work and Pensions, 2006b) 
were published at the end of July 2006. His analysis of the Agency’s problems put 
failure down to both policy and operational factors. The policy objectives of the 
Agency were ‘overly ambitious’ with potentially conflicting joint aims to tackle child 
poverty and reduce the financial burden on the taxpayer. Furthermore, the complexity 
of the system, particularly the process through which it sought to make awards 
sensitive to the circumstances of individuals, made it very difficult to administer 
efficiently. Moreover, because under the old CSA system the exchequer effectively 
retained all child support payments made to mothers claiming Income Support, and 
mothers qualified for only £10 of any payments made under the system introduced 
from 2003, there was little financial incentive for parents claiming means-tested 
benefits to co-operate 
 
Sir David Henshaw’s recommendations represented a departure from the existing 
child support system in a number of significant areas. First, parents with care could 
choose not to have an arrangement for child support in place. Furthermore, parents on 
benefits would no longer be compelled to use a government agency to obtain an 
award. The focus instead would be on encouraging parents to reach agreement 
privately. Where parents could not agree over child support arrangements, a new 
administrative system would be available to them. The focus of this new system 
would be on tracing the absent parent, establishing an award, monitoring payment and 
enforcing compliance. 
 
The recommendations also contained a renewed emphasis on tackling child poverty 
through child support system. The Henshaw Redesign recommended that a much 
larger amount of child support be disregarded in the calculation of benefit entitlement 
and passed through to parents. In addition to having the reduction of poverty firmly in 
its sights, this recommendation also aimed to increase the incentives for mothers and 
fathers to arrive at agreements voluntarily. Furthermore, it was hoped that by creating 
such incentives and generally simplifying the system, the number of parents with care 
with an award and in receipt of payments might rise. This approach drew inspiration 
from similar policies found to raise the proportion of mothers in receipt of support in 
Wisconsin (Meyer and Cancian, 2001).  
 
The New Labour government welcomed the Henshaw Redesign’s main conclusions 
and a White Paper – ‘A New System of Child Maintenance’ - was published in 
December 2006 setting out proposals for legislation (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2006a). The White Paper built in large part on Henshaw’s recommendations 
placing a strong emphasis on enforcement as well as announcing the new Child 
Maintenance and Enforcement Commission or C-MEC, to replace the Child Support 
Agency. Private arrangements will underpin the new system with the state stepping in 
only where agreement is not reached voluntarily. Moreover, the White Paper confirms 
the intention that no longer should an application for benefits by a parent with care be 
considered an application for child maintenance, as is the case under current 
arrangements. Furthermore, measures to encourage more joint registration of births 
were also outlined. 
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Previous studies of award status 
There are few studies based on data collected in Britain which consider the factors 
associated with award status. Recent published estimates based on the 2004 FACS 
survey show that only half of families due child support reported having some type of 
award (Lyon, Barnes and Sweiry 2006)7. Couples were more likely to have an award 
than lone parents – 60 per cent as compared to 48 per cent – as were older families 
and working families. Of those with an award, 65 per cent actually received payment. 
 
Previous analysis of FACS and its forerunner studies commissioned by the 
Department for Work and Pensions8 showed that award rates drifted up very slightly 
between the mid 1990s and 2001. The proportion of lone mothers without an award 
declined to 51 per cent in 2001 from 58 per cent in 1994 (Marsh and Perry, 2003). 
Over the same period, the proportion with court orders fell, which was to be expected. 
Furthermore, the proportion of private agreements grew slightly. Since the late 
nineties, the proportion of lone mothers reporting a CSA award has remained at 
approximately two in ten (see Table 1). It is important to note that these are mothers 
with CSA awards only. Some mothers have a combination of awards, often where 
there is more than one former partner with whom they have had children. Marsh and 
Perry (2003) estimate that about 6 per cent of lone mothers with children eligible for 
support had a CSA award combined with some other arrangement. 
 
Examining compliance by award status, Marsh and Perry (2003) found that receipt 
was highest under private agreements (92 per cent), compared to court orders (two 
thirds) and CSA awards (29 per cent). Marsh and Rowlingson 2002 found that award 
status for lone mothers varied by marital status. Six in ten lone mothers separated 
from marriage had an award; whilst half of those separated from cohabitation did so, 
as did just over a quarter of single never married lone mothers. Similar patterns were 
found by Marsh et al (2001). Lone mothers who worked less than 16 hours per week 
or not at all were less likely to have an award (four in ten) than mothers who worked 
longer hours (six in ten) (Marsh and Rowlingson 2002 and Marsh et al 2001). Finally, 
higher income families were more likely to have arrangements for child support in 
place. 
 
For more detailed analyses of child support award status we need to turn to evidence 
from the United States, where there are a number of studies that have examined 
factors associated with award rates, very often as part of a wider investigation into 
compliance. 
 
                                              
7  These results differ slightly from the estimates based on 2004 data presented in Table 
1 due to the different sample selection criteria used. 
8  The Survey of Low-income Families (SOLIF) and Programme of Research into Low 
Income Families (PRILIF) 
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Generally US studies find that older mothers are more likely to have an award (Beller 
and Graham, 1986; Hanson et al, 1996; Miller and Garfinkel, 1999) while Black and 
Hispanic mothers have lower award rates (Argys and Peters, 2001; Beller and 
Graham, 1986; Hanson et al, 1996; Miller and Garfinkel, 1999; Robins and 
Dickinson, 1984). However, Teachman (1990) finds the effect of race diminishes once 
the incomes of both the father and mother at divorce are controlled for. Argys and 
Peters (2001) find that although award rates are lower for Black families there is on 
average more contact between Black non-resident fathers and their children. 
 
Studies also find that previous marital status is important. Never married mothers 
were less likely to have an award than those separated from marriage (Beller and 
Graham, 1986; Hanson et al, 1996; Teachman 1990). Argys and Peters (2001) find 
that mothers who re-partner are less likely to have an award, whilst the reverse was 
the case for non-resident fathers. Mother’s education has been shown to be important 
in a number of studies, with better educated mothers more likely to have an award 
(Argys and Peters, 2001; Beller and Graham, 1986; Hanson et al, 1996; Miller and 
Garfinkel, 1999; Robins and Dickinson, 1984; and Teachman, 1990). Argys and 
Peters (2001), however, find that father’s education had no effect on whether an award 
was in place.  Most US studies find that families are more likely to have an award the 
more children due support (Hanson et al, 1996; Argys and Peters, 2001; and Miller 
and Garfinkel, 1999).  
 
Child support arrangements vary across the US, from state to state, and studies also 
find regional variations in award rates (Beller and Graham, 1986; and Robins and 
Dickinson, 1984). Other research looks at the affects of state expenditure on the 
collection of child support, efficiency of expenditure and enforcement provisions on 
award status (for example Argys and Peters, 2001 and Miller and Garfinkel, 1999).  
As one might expect, these studies find that tougher enforcement leads to higher 
award rates. 
 
Teachman (1990), Hanson et al (1996) and Robins and Dickinson (1984) look at the 
economic position of mothers and fathers and award status. Robins and Dickinson 
(1984) find that employed mothers are more likely to have an award than those 
without work. Teachman (1990) found only a small statistically significant effect of 
father’s income on award status and that mother’s income at divorce was positively 
associated with subsequently obtaining an award. Hanson et al (1996), however, found 
that mothers’ incomes at time of divorce or first birth was negatively associated with 
award status but that the reverse was the case for fathers. 
 
Huang and Pouncy (2005) look at factors determining the type of child support 
arrangements mothers have. They distinguish between formal and informal 
arrangements9, and find that better qualified mothers with more children, living in 
                                              
9  In Huang and Pouncy (2005) a ‘formal’ legal agreement referred to the position where 
mothers had a legally enforceable written document, whilst an ‘informal’ agreement 
related to a verbal or written agreement which was not legally enforceable. Huang and 
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rural areas were more likely to have ‘formal legal’ agreements for child support; 
whereas those from minority ethnic groups, those never married, separated or 
remarried, or living in city centres were more likely to have no award. Those with 
‘informal’ arrangements tended to be younger, separated, have a high school 
education and larger families. 
 
The data 
The data come from the Families and Children Study, or FACS. FACS is an annual 
longitudinal survey comprising face-to-face interviews with around 7,500 parents. The 
sample is topped-up or refreshed at each wave so that the data from any given year 
can be analysed as a representative cross-section. In most cases the main respondent is 
the mother, the sample having originally been drawn from Child Benefit records. For 
the bulk of the analysis discussed in this paper the data come from four waves of 
FACS collected over the period 2001 to 200410. 
 
The analysis is based on two samples. First, the 2004 FACS cross section sample is 
used to provide descriptive statistics of mothers’ award status by various classificatory 
variables. The sample is restricted to families containing children who have a living 
non-resident parent liable to pay child support. Families without dependent children11 
were excluded, as were those where a male was the main respondent thereby 
removing lone father households12.  Second, samples for the years 2001, 2002 and 
2003 were selected on the same criteria as that for 2004. These four samples were then 
pooled to provide a large sample of observations on families due child support 
payments and upon which the main analyses are conducted13. 
                                                                                                                                            
Pouncy also included mothers in their analyses who had a ‘legal’ support order 
pending.  
10  FACS was previously known as the Survey of Low Income Families or SOLIF. Data 
were collected in 1999 and 2000 from low to moderate income families only and so 
have not been used in the analysis here.  
11  Where a dependent child is defined as being aged 16 or under, or under 19 and in full-
time education. 
12  Lone fathers comprise about four percent of the initial sample and are excluded 
because the small sample numbers make it difficult to draw reliable conclusions 
concerning their position. Their situation is also likely to be quite different to that of 
mothers.  
13  It is possible that by pooling the data mothers who have split recently are under-
represented. Once a mother has separated, they enter the sample and remain in it 
because of the repeated observations on the same mothers. Thus recent splitters might 
form a lower fraction of the pooled sample than they would of a cross-section sample. 
In order to test for this, the length of time since mothers had separated from their last 
partner in the pooled dataset was compared to the length of time since mothers had 
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It is likely that some mothers may make mistakes in reporting their award status. For 
example, once in place an award should remain in force until the child concerned 
reaches at least their 16th birthday. Marsh and Rowlingson (2002) noted, however, 
that some mothers interviewed as part of FACS considered their award to have ceased 
when payments were no longer received even though ‘technically’ they still had an 
award. This is likely particularly in the case of private agreements; though some 
mothers with CSA awards may also view their award to have expired when payments 
are no longer made. Generally, it seems reasonable to question whether a private 
agreement can be said to exist if no payment is received, even though a commitment 
to pay was at one time made. Furthermore some mothers may have pursued a claim 
for support but the CSA has assessed the father to have a zero liability. Administrative 
statistics based on data from the CSA show that around a third of calculated 
assessments were for zero amounts at June 2006 (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2006), whereas FACS data in 2004 suggest that this was the case with only around 
eight per cent of CSA awards. Thus a substantial number of mothers may have an 
award but not be due payments. Mothers in such circumstances might consider 
themselves not to have award even though ‘technically’ an award has been made.  
Other mothers, those claiming means-tested benefits, because they receive no 
payments under the old CSA system may consider themselves again not to have an 
award, or at least may respond as such when questioned in a survey. Therefore, FACS 
data may undercount both private and CSA awards and this may explain the apparent 
discrepancy between survey and administrative data sources at least in respect of the 
CSA. Further potential problems with FACS data mentioned in the introductory 
remarks surrounds the potential for confusion among respondents as to whether their 
award is a court order or a private agreement.  
 
As previously noted, the data come from responses obtained from mothers. In both the 
British and US literature attempts have been made to account for the discrepant 
reports given by separated mothers and fathers in different surveys to questions 
regarding the level of contact between non-resident fathers and their children, and the 
payment of child support. For example, Bradshaw, et al (1999) for the UK attempt to 
account for the divergence between reported receipt of child support by mothers and 
payments by fathers. Atkinson and McKay (2005) report considerable differences 
between the accounts of non-resident parents and parents with care as to whether 
support was paid or not, but fewer differences in reported levels of contact. Wikeley, 
et al (2001), one of the few studies to draw a matched sample of non-resident parents 
and parents with care found that separated mothers and fathers accounts of contact and 
payments often differed.  
 
These findings raise concerns as to the reliance on mothers’ reports of award status, 
contact and the non-resident fathers’ employment status used here. Some consolation 
in relying on mothers’ reports can be derived, however, from the conclusions drawn 
from US studies suggesting that non-resident fathers tend to over-state payment of 
                                                                                                                                            
separated in the 2004 FACS cross-section data set. This comparison revealed no 
significant differences.  
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child support while mothers give accurate accounts (Del Boca, 2003; Schaeffer, 
Seltzer and Kawitter, 1991). 
 
Analytical approach 
The main analyses discussed in this paper comprise a series of multivariate regression 
models. Two types of regression models are estimated. First, probit regression models 
are used to explore the relationship between a series of explanatory variables and the 
probability that a mother has ‘no award’. Second, a multinomial logistic regression 
model is estimated to examine the net effects of the same variables on the type of 
award mothers’ have. Both types of model are estimated on the pooled sample 
described previously. 
 
The dependent variable in the multinomial logit model identifies whether the mother 
has a private agreement, a CSA award, or no award; cases where mothers had court 
orders or more than one type of award14 were excluded from the analysis. Table 1 
below, examines the percentages of mothers due support by various forms of 
award/agreement by year, along with the un-weighted total sample sizes in each year 
and the total pooled sample size. 
 
                                              
14  Mothers reporting court orders are likely to have been misclassified or their awards 
pre-date the Child Support Agency and are therefore of less importance in terms of 
current policy. Mothers with combined awards make up a small proportion of the 
sample, around six per cent and for the sake of clarity are omitted. A multinomial 
logistic regression model with five outcomes – court order only, private agreement 
only, CSA award only, no award and combinations was also estimated alongside the 
three outcome model reported here. The coefficient estimates in the two models for 
the outcomes common to both are very similar. 
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Table 1: Orders, agreements and awards for child support for lone mothers and 
step families (where mother main respondent) (FACS 2001-2004)  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 Pooled sample size 
(un-weighted) 
 Column Percentages  
Court order only 4 5 4 4 421 
Private agreement only 19 20 21 23 1,918 
Child Support Agency 
assessment only 
19 20 19 20 1,862 
Combinations (multiple 
awards) 
7 6 6 6 586 
No award 51 48 50 47 4,621 
      
Un-weighted sample size 2,363 2,430 2,355 2,260 9,408 
 
Notes: weighted estimates 
 
In terms of the regression models, it is assumed that whether an award for child 
support is in place is determined by: 
? The non-resident father’s ability to pay and other aspects of his circumstances; 
? The strength of ties between the non-resident father, the resident mother, and his 
children reflecting the father’s willing to pay; 
? The economic circumstance of the mother and children; 
? Following previous research, the demographic characteristics of the mother which 
are important in their own right but also due to assortive mating (Garfinkel, Glei 
and McLanahan, 2002) are likely to vary with certain important characteristics of 
the non-resident father; and 
? The policy and institutional context. 
 
Generally, it might be expected that non-resident fathers with higher incomes would 
be more likely to establish child support arrangements - they have more resources to 
devote to their children! Moreover, any amount awarded would be higher for fathers 
on larger incomes thus creating a greater incentive for mothers to pursue a claim. 
Furthermore, higher income fathers are more likely to have been married to their ex-
partner, possibly signifying stronger ties with the mother and children, and thus an 
increased probability that an award has been made or agreement reached. 
Alternatively, married fathers may be less able to avoid enforcement. It is also 
possible that due to assortive mating higher income fathers are more likely to have 
partnered with mothers better able to negotiate arrangements for child support. 
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A major limitation of FACS data, other than those previously noted, is that the income 
or earnings of the non-resident father is not recorded. Instead, the employment status 
of the non-resident father as reported by the resident mother is used as an indicator of 
the father’s ability to pay. A further complication is that quite a large proportion of 
mothers did not know the employment status of the non-resident father. These 
mothers were kept in the analysis and identified as a separate category. Employment 
status, however, is only a weak indicator of ability to pay, with fathers on low 
earnings likely to find it difficult to always meet their obligations. 
 
The father’s strength of ties with his children and ex-partner were captured by 
variables which describe the extent of contact between the non-resident father, his 
children and his ex-partner; a variable which records the length of time since the 
parents separated; and a variable which recorded prior marital status. Generally, it 
might be expected that fathers with closer ties would be more likely to have an 
agreement or award for child support in place. Alternatively, those in very close 
contact might provide forms of informal support which could be placed in jeopardy 
should more formal arrangements be pursued. Therefore for some mothers there may 
be less of an incentive to obtain formal arrangements where contact is frequent. 
Furthermore, where there is ‘shared-care’ of children and contact is frequent, non-
resident fathers may be assessed through the CSA as having a zero maintenance 
liability; in these circumstances mothers may tend to under report awards.   
 
As the time since separation grows15, it might be reasonable to expect that the chances 
of a mother having an award will decline. This is so because the ties between a non-
resident father and his children might be expected to grow weaker. 
 
The inclusion of a variable measuring the extent of contact raises the issue of whether 
contact is a cause of award status, or a consequence of it? Put a different way, it is 
difficult to determine the direction of causality. For example, fathers subject to a CSA 
award where no prior contact between the father and his children had occurred may 
subsequently seek contact in order to determine whether the maintenance paid is used 
in a manner they approve of. Alternatively, and more consistent with the models 
estimated here, fathers in regular contact may be more likely to co-operate in 
establishing an award in the first place.  
 
The economic position of the parent with care and her family are captured through the 
mother’s work status and whether she claims Income Support16. Similarly to contact, 
the problem of reverse causation also affects the interpretation of coefficients 
associated with Income Support and mother’s employment status. Families where the 
                                              
15  As mothers may have had more than one previous relationship, the variable which 
measures time since separation does so for the mother’s last relationship only 
16  Family income though available has not been used in the analysis here. This is 
because it has not proved possible to accurately subtract out maintenance receipts 
from total family income in the waves of FACS data analysed, specifically where 
there is partial compliance. 
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mother does not work and/or where she claims Income Support are in greater need. 
Where non-resident fathers are motivated to make provision for their children in 
response to need, it might be expected that employed mothers might be less likely to 
have an award. Conversely, working mothers may possess certain skills or attributes 
which make them more effective in pursuing a claim. Alternatively, mothers with an 
award and in receipt of maintenance may supply fewer hours as a result of an ‘income 
effect’ on their labour supply.  
 
The effect of an Income Support claim on award status is complicated by the fact that 
claimants are effectively compelled to co-operate with the CSA. Therefore for two 
reasons: their greater need and the operation of the CSA, it might be expect that 
mothers claiming Income Support would be more likely to have an award. However as 
discussed previously, because of the way child support payments are treated in 
Income Support there is little incentive for these mothers to pursue a non-resident 
father or co-operate with the Agency, and mothers claiming Income Support may 
under-report awards. Furthermore, for women out of work and for those claiming IS 
their ex-partners may have relatively low earnings and be more likely to claim 
benefits themselves. In addition, the data reveal that quite a sizeable proportion of 
mothers on Income Support continue to hold private agreements, suggesting a weak 
enforcement environment for mothers who claim state benefits – though it is 
important to remember that these data may undercount awards particularly among IS 
claimants. 
 
The socio-demographic characteristics of mothers controlled for in the analysis 
include age, age of youngest child, ethnic group, highest qualification, housing tenure, 
number of children due support, current partnership status and region. The inclusion 
of these variables is motivated by findings from previous research. Current partnership 
status controls for the effect of re-partnering. 
 
The inclusion of dummy variables capturing successive years in the analysis can to 
some extent control for the effects of policy changes over time. During the period over 
which the data were collected one major policy change took place - the 2003 CSA 
reforms. It is possible that the year dummy variables included in the models might 
capture some of the effect of these reforms. Furthermore, child support services 
delivered through the Agency are done so through six offices located in different parts 
of the UK and serving different regions17. The regional dummy variables in the 
models may, to a limited extent, pick-up differential performance by these offices. 
 
Previous studies suggest that geographical distance between the home in which the 
children live and that of the non-resident father, whether he has re-partnered, is living 
with other children for whom he has responsibility, and whether he is currently 
                                              
17  The Child Support Agency’s regional offices are located in Belfast (covering the 
East of England and Northern Ireland) Dudley (the English Midlands) Falkirk 
(Scotland and North East England) Hastings (South East England) Plymouth (South 
West England) and Birkenhead (covering Wales and North West England). 
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married to a different partner, may all be important determinants of award status. 
Unfortunately FACS data do not allow these factors to be controlled for directly in the 
analysis and their omission is likely to lead to some biases. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 examine award status by various socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of the mother. The data come from the 2004 FACS survey. The 
analysis distinguishes between the type of award a mother had and whether she had an 
award at all. Where mothers report having an award they are grouped on the basis of 
whether they had a court order, private agreement, CSA award, or some combination 
of these. 
 
Table 2, reveals that mothers with court orders, reflecting policy changes, tended to be 
quite a bit older than mothers with other types of award and those mothers with no 
award tend to be younger. As a result, mothers with no award have younger children. 
A third of mothers with a CSA award were living with a partner, whilst 27 per cent 
with a private agreement were doing so and less than a quarter of mothers with no 
award. Mothers with no award also tended to be poorly qualified: 28 per cent had no 
formal qualifications, compared to 19 per cent of mothers with a CSA award and 13 
per cent of mothers with a court order. One in ten of mothers with no award were from 
a non-white ethnic group. This compared to only three percent of mothers with a CSA 
award and five percent of mothers with a private agreement.  
 
The analysis of award status by region revealed some interesting variations. Most 
notable of which were the high proportions of mothers without awards in London and 
Wales. In both regions two thirds of mothers eligible for child support were without 
an award. In Wales, this appeared to be due to low rates of both private agreements 
and CSA awards, whereas in London, it appears mainly due to the low rate of CSA 
awards, by far the lowest proportion of any region. The rate at which mothers reported 
having a CSA award was also low in the East Midlands. 
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Table 2: Awards by mother’s basic socio-demographic indicators, FACS 2004 
 Court 
Order 
only 
Private 
Agreement 
only 
Child 
Support 
Agency 
Award 
only 
Combination No Award/ 
Agreement or 
Order 
 Column percentages
Age of mother      
Under 25 1 8 11 10 19 
25 to 29 3 14 12 10 16 
30 to 39 34 45 51 44 41 
40 or over 62 34 26 37 24 
Age of youngest child      
2 or under 9 25 24 24 32 
3 to 4 6 15 11 15 13 
5 to 11 38 40 41 38 35 
12 to 16 39 17 22 19 17 
17 or over 8 3 2 5 2 
Current partnership status 
Couple/re-partnered 36 27 33 34 23 
Lone parent 64 73 67 66 77 
Ethnic group 4 5 3 4 10 
White 96 95 97 96 90 
Non-white 4 5 3 4 10 
Highest qualification of the mother 
None 13 14 19 18 28 
GCSE 42 56 63 62 56 
A Level 15 12 10 5 9 
Degree 26 15 6 13 6 
Other 5 3 1 1 1 
      
Un-weighted sample 
size 
97 520 454 130 1,059 
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 Court 
Order 
only 
Private 
Agreement 
only 
Child 
Support 
Agency 
Award 
only 
Combination No Award/ 
Agreement or 
Order 
Row percentages
Region      
North East 2 21 24 6 47 
North West 4 23 21 4 47 
Yorks and Humber 4 25 20 6 44 
East Midlands 4 21 15 4 56 
West Midlands 7 20 25 9 39 
South West  5 27 21 9 39 
Eastern 3 23 27 7 40 
London 3 22 8 3 64 
South East 7 29 20 6 38 
Wales 3 14 15 4 64 
Scotland 2 28 21 4 45 
 
Base: 2260 families, with dependent children, with at least once child with a living parent residing 
outside the household – female respondents only thereby excluding lone fathers. Those who respond 
to the marital status question indicating that they are widows are also excluded. 
Weighted estimates 
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Table 3 examines mothers’ award status by their economic position defined on the 
basis of their housing tenure, employment status and whether they claimed Income 
Support.  
 
Table 3: Awards by economic circumstances of the mother FACS 2004 
 Court 
Order 
Private 
Agreement 
Child 
Support 
Agency 
Award 
Combinations No Award/ 
Agreement or 
Order 
 Column percentages
Mother’s tenure      
Social 14 24 45 34 55 
Private 9 12 14 12 15 
Owner occup. 77 60 38 52 26 
Other 0 4 4 3 4 
Mother’s work status 
Working 30+ 
hours 
44 38 21 36 20 
Working 16-29 
hours 
25 34 33 28 18 
Working less than 
16 hours 
4 6 4 6 5 
Not working 27 23 43 29 57 
Income Support status 
Not received 92 86 65 84 51 
Received 8 14 35 16 49 
      
Un-weighted 
sample size 
97 520 454 130 1,059 
 
Base: 2260 families, with dependent children, with at least once child with a living parent residing 
outside the household – female respondents only thereby excluding lone fathers. Those who respond 
to the marital status question indicating that they are widows are also excluded. 
Weighted estimates 
 
The results reveal that mothers without awards are significantly disadvantaged 
compared to other mothers due support, particularly compared to those mothers with 
court orders and private agreements. Over half of them are social tenants compared to 
less than a quarter of those with a private agreement. Nearly six in ten are out of work, 
compared to 43 per cent of mothers with a CSA award and 23 per cent of mothers 
with a private arrangement. Moreover, half receive Income Support compared to just 
over a third of CSA award mothers.  
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Table 4: Awards by previous relationship and position of the non-resident father 
FACS 2004 
 Court 
Order 
Private 
Agreement 
Child 
Support 
Agency 
Award 
Combinations No Award/ 
Agreement 
or Order 
 Column percentage
Mother lived with NRP any time since 12 months before birth of eldest child? 
No 10 15 20 15 36 
Yes 90 85 80 85 64 
Column percentages: all mothers with a previous relationship
Whether married in last relationship? 
Yes 84 60 57 64 47 
No 16 40 43 36 53 
Mean length of last relationship 
in months 
113 104 77 79 76 
Length of time in months since 
end of last relationship 
(excluding current relationship 
for those in a couple) 
99 58 77 82 78 
      
Un-weighted sample size – those 
with a previous relationship 
89 444 366 111 683 
Column percentages
Contact NRP and child(ren) 
Daily 3 10 5 5 10 
Weekly 31 60 31 49 29 
Fortnightly 16 12 13 13 6 
Monthly 11 6 8 10 6 
Yearly 13 8 11 8 9 
Less often 6 1 5 2 4 
No contact 21 2 26 14 36 
Contact NRP and PWC 
Daily 1 10 4 3 9 
Weekly 19 50 22 40 22 
Fortnightly 12 10 7 11 5 
Monthly 8 10 7 9 5 
Yearly 12 7 12 6 8 
Less often 9 2 6 3 5 
No contact 39 11 42 28 46 
Mean number of children with a 
living non-resident parent in 
family 
1.5 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.6 
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 Court 
Order 
Private 
Agreement 
Child 
Support 
Agency 
Award 
Combinations No Award/ 
Agreement 
or Order 
NRP employment status 
Employed NRP 71 83 63 76 37 
Employment status of NRP 
unknown 
14 6 20 14 37 
      
Un-weighted sample size – all 
mothers 
97 520 454 130 1,059 
 
Base: 2260 families, with dependent children, with at least once child with a living parent residing 
outside the household – female respondents only thereby excluding lone fathers. Those who respond 
to the marital status question indicating that they are widows are also excluded. 
Weighted estimates 
 
It appears that mothers without an award live in less favourable economic 
circumstances compared to other families eligible for child support. They have higher 
levels of welfare receipt and lower rates of employment. However, it must also be 
acknowledged that mothers with CSA awards are also a relatively disadvantaged 
group. They too have high rates of Income Support receipt and low levels of working. 
 
Table 4, considers award status by various aspects of the mother’s last relationship: 
whether she was married, the length of time her last relationship lasted and the length 
of time since she separated from her last partner. Contact between the mother and the 
non-resident father, and the children and the non-resident father, are also examined, as 
is his employment status. 
 
Over a third of mothers with no award had never lived with the father of their 
children18. This compares to one fifth of mothers with a CSA award and 15 per cent of 
mothers with a private agreement. Mothers with no award who had lived with the non-
resident father were less likely to have been married to him, and their last 
relationships on average did not last as long, particularly compared to mothers with 
private agreements. However, mothers with private agreements tended to have had 
relationships which ended more recently.  
 
Four in ten mothers without an award reported that at least one of their children had 
daily or weekly contact with the father, while over a third reported no contact between 
their children and the non-resident father. Very different patterns of contact were 
reported by mothers with private agreements. Seven in ten reported daily or weekly 
contact and only two per cent no contact. 
 
                                              
18  That is in the period commencing 12 months prior to the birth of the first child up to 
the date of interview 
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Only 37 per cent of mothers without an award knew that the non-resident father was 
in work. This is in stark contrast to the 83 per cent of mothers with a private 
agreement who could say the same. Only six per cent of mothers with a private 
agreement were unaware of the work status of the non-resident father, compared to 
well over a third of mothers without an award. The rate of employment of non-
resident fathers reported by mothers with a CSA award was higher than those reported 
by mothers without an award but lower than those reported by mothers with private 
agreements. 
 
To summarise, those mothers with CSA awards tend to be more like mothers without 
awards, though less disadvantaged. Mothers who report private agreements are more 
likely to be owner-occupiers and much less likely to claim Income Support. They tend 
to have split from their former partners more recently and there were higher rates of 
contact between the children and the non-resident father as well as between the 
mother and the non-resident father. Mothers with private agreements were more likely 
to have lived with their former partner and their relationships had lasted longer. 
 
Probability of mothers having no award 
These descriptive analysis suggest that mothers without an award for child support are 
more disadvantaged and that the characteristics of mothers vary by type of award. 
However, without resorting to multivariate regression analysis it is difficult to 
describe the net effect of these characteristics on the probability of having an award. 
In this section, results from two simple probit regression models are reported, 
exploring the net effects of variables on the probability that a mother has no award; in 
the section which follows regression analysis is used to examine the different types of 
awards mothers have. 
 
Table 5, presents the results from the two models. The sample upon which Model 1 is 
estimated comprises all mothers caring for a child with a non-resident father liable to 
pay child support. The sample is the pooled sample, containing mothers from all four 
waves of FACS, giving a total sample size of around 9,300. Model 2 is estimated on a 
sub-sample of mothers who had lived with the father of their children. The second 
model allows additional information about the last relationship of the mother to be 
included in the analysis. Because the samples are longitudinal, the same mother can 
appear up to four times in the sample and this is taken into account in the estimation 
of standard errors and associated hypotheses tests. 
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Table 5: Effects of explanatory variables on the probability of the mother having 
no award (probit regressions) 
 Model 1 – all mothers 
eligible for child support 
Model 2 – mothers who 
lived with the NRP 
 Marginal effects Marginal effects 
Year (2001)   
2002 -.015 -.026* 
2003 -.007 -.017 
2004 -.031** -.047** 
Age group of the mother (under 25 years) 
25 to 29 -.003 -.008 
30 to 40 -.038 -.074** 
Over 40 -.041 -.096** 
Age of youngest child (under 2)   
3 to 4 -.017 -.018 
5 to 11 .001 .024 
12 to 16 -.008 .012 
17 or over .077* .130*** 
Number of children due support (One)   
Two -.055*** -.040** 
Three of more -.068*** -.037 
Mother’s Ethnic group (white)   
Black .023 .044 
Asian .140** .160** 
Other (including mixed race) .157*** .133** 
Current partnership status (couple)   
Lone parent -.013 -.030 
Highest qualification of the mother (no qualifications) 
GCSE -.054*** -.041* 
A Level -.079*** -.067** 
Degree -.034 -.023 
Other -.041 -.042 
Region (North East)   
North West .038 .070 
Yorks & Humber .078** .087* 
East Midlands .070* .105** 
West Midlands -.020 -.006 
South West -.079** -.053 
Eastern .023 .041 
London .097** .146*** 
South East .026 .058 
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 Model 1 – all mothers 
eligible for child support 
Model 2 – mothers who 
lived with the NRP 
   
Wales .107*** .118** 
Scotland .028 .040 
Mother’s Income Support receipt (no claim): 
On Income Support .091*** .098*** 
Mother’s work status (works 30 hours or more) 
16-29 hours -.045** -.058** 
Less than 16 hours .001 -.016 
No work .025 .027 
Tenure (social tenant):   
Private tenant -.005 -.003 
Owner Occ. -.097*** -.117*** 
Other -.125*** -.096** 
Frequency of contact between non-resident father and children (Daily) 
Weekly -.092*** -.095*** 
Fortnightly -.115*** -.143*** 
Monthly -.010 -.030 
Annually -.013 -.032 
Less often .086** .069 
No contact .113*** .097*** 
Employment of non-resident father (not employed) 
Employed -.272*** -.261*** 
Status unknown .033 .022 
Length of time since end of last relationship (5 to 10 years) 
Less than 12 months .119*** .093*** 
1 to 3 years -.031 -.049** 
3 to 5 years .002 -.009 
10 to 15 years .001 .017 
15 years or more .067 .096** 
No previous partnership (never lived 
with father) 
.115*** n/a 
Length of time last relationship lasted (less than three years) 
3 to 10 years  .030 
10 to 15 years  .061* 
Over 15 years  .127** 
Whether mother was married to the non-resident father (Yes, married) 
No, not married  .068*** 
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Reference or contrast categories in parentheses 
Model 1 percentage correct predictions 72 per cent, sample size 9,277, Pseudo r-squared 0.19 
Model 2 percentage correct predictions 72 per cent, sample size 6,988, Pseudo r-squared 0.17 
Standard errors are adjusted for repeated observations on the same mother 
* .05 < p <.10, ** .01 < p <.05, *** p <.01 
 
The coefficients reported in the Table 5 for both models are marginal effects. These 
show the change in the probability of a mother having no award if she were to move 
to the category indicated from a reference or contrast category. In Table 5, the 
reference or contrast category for each variable is identified within the brackets next 
to the variable names in bold. Coefficients with a positive sign indicate an increased 
probability of having no award, while those with a negative sign a reduced 
probability. The discussion focuses on results from Model 1, referring to those from 
Model 2 where there are notable differences. 
 
In Model 1, net of other effects, mothers in 2004 displayed on average a three per cent 
lower probability of being without an award than equivalent mothers in 2001. Model 2 
reveals a slightly greater increase, suggesting never-partnered mothers excluded from 
Model 2 have not benefited as much from the increase in award rates. The observed 
improvements in award rates may be capturing the effects of reforms introduced 
through the 2000 Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act (though see results 
from the multinomial logit regression in the next section). 
 
US studies find that mother’s age is positively related to the probability of an award. 
In Model 1, the probability of no award did decline with age though the effects were 
not statistically significant at conventional levels. In Model 2, older mothers were 
more likely to have an award. The age effects were also statistically significant in 
Model 2. 
 
All things being equal, compared to mothers with one child, those with two or more 
children were more likely to have an award. This suggests possibly that either women 
with larger families were more likely to pursue a non-resident father for child support, 
may be because of greater need, or because of greater need fathers are more likely to 
co-operate with attempts to establish an award. This finding is in line with findings 
from the US. 
 
As was the case in US studies, ethnic group was also an important determinant of 
award status. Relative to Whites, Blacks displayed a slight but not statistically 
significant increased probability of no award. However, among ‘Asian’ mothers and 
those categorised as ‘Other’ (including mixed-race mothers) the probability of no 
award was substantially higher than it was for Whites. In Model 1, the probability of 
no award for Asian mothers was 14 per cent higher than for Whites, while the 
probability of no award for those categorised as ‘Other’ (including mixed race 
mothers) 16 per cent higher. 
 
The regional differences in award rates noted previously were also apparent in the 
regression results. All things being equal, mothers in Yorkshire and Humberside, the 
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East Midlands, London and Wales had an increased probability of no award compared 
to mothers in the North East of England. Mothers in the South West were more likely 
to have an award. This regional variation in award rates could be due to variations in 
patterns of family breakdown, parenting apart or socio-economic factors. As 
previously suggested, these results might be picking-up variations in the performance 
of CSA regional offices. In Model 2, the relative disadvantage for mothers in 
Yorkshire, East Midlands, London and Wales compared to those in the North East 
appear to be greater. 
 
Despite the requirement for mandatory cooperation with the CSA, all things being 
equal, mothers claiming Income Support were less likely to report an award than those 
not claiming. In Model 1, the probability of not having an award for mothers on 
Income Support was nine per cent higher. It has been widely recognised that there is 
little incentive for lone mothers claiming Income Support to pursue a claim, a problem 
acknowledged by the Henshaw Redesign (Department for Work and Pensions, 
2006b). Moreover, although the inclusion of the father’s employment status attempts 
to control for his ability to pay, it can only do so imperfectly. Thus some of the 
increased probability of no award for mothers on Income Support found in these 
models may reflect a relatively low capacity to pay among fathers and the possibility 
that mothers on Income Support have a tendency to under report awards. 
 
Mothers who worked 30 hours or more were less likely to have an award than mothers 
who worked part-time hours19. In Model 1, part-time mothers had a probability of no 
award five per cent lower, all things being equal, than mothers working full-time. This 
may suggest that for some mothers establishing their financial independence is 
important and this motivation manifests itself in full-time work and a reduced 
tendency to seek child support. Alternatively, mothers working part-time may have 
been more likely in the past to have claimed Income Support than those working full-
time, and thus more likely to have had contact with the CSA. An ‘income effect’ may 
also be discernable, whereby mothers reduce their hours in response increased income 
from maintenance payments. As mentioned previously, however, the direction of the 
relationship between mothers’ work and award status is difficult to interpret. 
 
Contact is an important variable in both models and the results are similar in both, but 
again the direction of the effect is not clear. Does contact reveal stronger ties between 
an absent father and his children and thus a greater willingness to enter into formal 
arrangements for child support? Alternatively, does entering into an agreement to pay 
support raise the probability that a father will seek contact or be given access to his 
children? Fathers in such circumstances, compelled to cooperate and possibly pay 
support might subsequently seek contact. Or, fathers may feel making payments gives 
them the right to spend more time with their children (Atkinson and McKay, 2005). 
Alternatively, mothers might prevent contact until the father agrees to pay support.  
 
                                              
19  Part time hours are 16 to 29 hours per week. Full-time hours are 30 or more hours per 
week. 
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Model 1 reveals quite a complex relationship between contact and award status. 
Where fathers are in weekly or fortnightly contact with their children the probability 
of having no award for mothers is nine and 12 per cent lower respectively than those 
in daily contact. In other words, those who reported daily contact were less likely to 
have an award than those reporting weekly or fortnightly contact. However, the 
probability of no award for mothers was much higher where fathers had no contact 
with their children. 
 
Thus the probability of an award being in place is highest where contact between 
fathers and their children is weekly or fortnightly, then daily and least likely where 
there is no contact. Daily contact between fathers and their children in all likelihood 
signifies some form of shared care. In such circumstances, mothers may be unwilling 
to pursue formal child support arrangements that could place such support and daily 
contact in jeopardy. Alternatively, the possibility that many fathers in daily contact 
have zero award assessments and thus mothers fail to acknowledge the existence of an 
award when questioned may partly explain these results. 
 
All things being equal, where the father’s employment status was known and he was 
in work, the chances of an award were substantially higher for mothers. Again the 
direction of causality is a little ambiguous. Fathers’ previously out of work might seek 
employment in order to meet their child support obligations. Alternatively, a father 
may avoid entering employment as this may increase the chances of the mother 
pursuing an award and or give rise to a positive liability where an award is in place. 
On the other hand and probably more likely, employment status may be strongly 
correlated with willingness as well as ability to pay and thus with award status. The 
results from Model 1 show that the probability of no award for mothers with a non-
resident father in work (where his employment status is known) was over 25 per cent 
less on average than it was where the non-resident father was out of work. 
 
There was a slight increase in the probability of no award as the length of time since 
separation grew. Compared to those who had been separated for between five to 10 
years, there was a slightly reduced probability of no award for those who had been 
separated for one to three years, and an increased probability for those separated for 
over 15 years. Neither of these effects, however, were statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The exception to this pattern was that compared to those 
separated for between five and ten years, those separated for less than 12 months had 
an increased probability of no award. This suggests that mothers and fathers take time 
after separation to establish arrangements. Mothers who had never lived with the 
father(s) of their children also had an increased probability of no award. 
 
Model 2, estimated on a sample of mothers who had formerly lived with a partner, 
includes two additional variables which measure the length of the mother’s last 
relationship and whether they were married. Unexpectedly, length of former 
relationship appears to be positively related to the probability of no award. Mothers 
whose former relationship lasted for over fifteen years had an increased probability of 
reporting no award of 13 per cent after controlling for other factors. This seems 
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counter intuitive. It would be reasonable to expect that mothers separated from long 
standing relationships would be more likely to have reported having an award for 
child support, not less likely as these results suggest. 
 
In contrast to these results, a simple tabulation of length of last relationship by award 
status shows that those whose last relationships were longer were more likely to have 
awards not less likely. Viewed alongside the results in Table 5, this suggests that it is 
not length of relationship itself with might raise the likelihood of an award but the 
types of mothers and fathers that have longer relationships. Once the characteristics of 
these mothers and fathers are controlled for, those with longer relationships appear to 
be less likely to have an award in place. However, it is still not clear why, after 
controlling for the full set of variables, those who had longer relationships were less 
likely to have awards. 
 
Finally, model 2 contained a variable which recorded whether the mother and the non-
resident father were previously married. In some cases the mother and non-resident 
father may still be legally married at the time of interview. Where fathers were 
married to the mother it might be expected this would signal a greater commitment to 
both the mother and children, and thus a greater likelihood of ongoing support post-
separation and therefore a higher probability of an award being in place. Alternatively, 
married men may be more likely to come into contact with formal institutional 
structures than non-married men, which compel them to enter into agreements. 
Results from Model 2 reveal that the probability of no award was 7 per cent higher for 
mothers who were not married to their former partners. 
 
These simple probit regression models show that the probability of having a child 
support award was linked to the number of children due support, ethnicity, the region 
in which the mother lived, her Income Support status, tenure and work status. In 
addition, where there was contact between the father and his children, and the father 
worked, mothers were more likely to report having arrangements in place. All things 
being equal those who had split from the father of their children in the last 12 months 
were less likely to report having an award than those who had been separated for 
between five to 10 years, as were those who have never lived with the father. 
 
Relative risks of different types of award 
In this next section, a multinomial logit regression model is used to examine the type 
of child support award a mother has by the same set of explanatory variables used in 
the previous regression models. The results are reported in Table 6. The effect of a 
given variable is expressed as the relative risk of having a certain type of award 
compared for example to no award. A coefficient greater than one indicates the 
variable concerned increases the relative risks of, for instances, having a private 
agreement as opposed to no award, relative to a contrast or reference category. 
Coefficients of less than one indicate a reduced risk.  
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The relative risk of having a private agreement as opposed to no award in 2004, was 
approximately 1.3 times (or 28 per cent higher) the risk of having a private agreement 
rather than no award in 2001. Similarly, the odds of having a CSA rather than no 
award in 2004 compared to 2001 were 1.13 times or 13 per cent higher. The latter 
effect, however, was not statistically significant at conventional levels. So the increase 
in award rates in 2004 compared to 2001 (see previous section) is more likely to be 
due, all things being equal, to an increase in private agreements. There is some 
evidence that mothers are more likely to have CSA awards in 2004 than 2001, though 
we can be less sure about this. 
 
As the age of youngest child rose the risk of having a private agreement as compared 
to no award fell. The risk of having a private agreement compared to CSA award also 
fell. This suggests that as the age of the youngest child rises, mothers are more likely 
to have CSA awards or no award than a private agreement.  
 
Mothers with three or more children had relative risks 1.7 times greater than those 
with one child of reporting a CSA award rather than no award.  The number of 
children did not help distinguish between private agreements and no award, therefore 
mothers with larger families tended therefore to have CSA awards. 
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Table 6: Model 2 - Relative risk of private agreements and Child Support Agency 
awards compared to no award – multinomial logit model (relative risk ratios) 
 Private 
agreements over 
no award 
Private 
agreements over 
CSA awards 
CSA awards 
over no 
award 
Year (2001)    
2002 1.107 1.031 1.074 
2003 1.060 0.985 1.076 
2004 1.277*** 1.129 1.131 
Age group of the mother (under 25 years) 
25 to 29 1.014 .9810 1.034 
30 to 40 1.130 1.001 1.130 
Over 40 1.194 1.236 .966 
Age of youngest child (under 2)    
3 to 4 .938 .809 1.159 
5 to 11 .843 .719** 1.173 
12 to 16 .739* .590*** 1.253 
17 or over .497*** .600* .829 
Number of children due support (One) 
Two .993 .721*** 1.377*** 
Three of more .861 .514*** 1.674*** 
Mother’s Ethnic group (white)    
Black 1.145 1.430 .800 
Asian .538 1.264 .426** 
Other (including mixed race) .745 1.990 .374** 
Current partnership status (couple) 
Lone parent 1.072 1.117 .959 
Highest qualification of the mother (no qualifications)  
GCSE 1.164 .877 1.327*** 
A Level 1.361* 1.157 1.177 
Degree 1.167 1.319 .884 
Other 1.259 1.662 .757 
Region (North East)    
North West 1.017 1.252 .813 
Yorks & Humber .951 1.472 .646** 
East Midlands 1.039 1.622* .641** 
West Midlands 1.177 1.131 1.040 
South West 1.885*** 1.495 1.261 
Eastern 1.063 1.390 .765 
London 1.313 2.989*** .439*** 
South East 1.334 1.970** .677** 
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 Private 
agreements over 
no award 
Private 
agreements over 
CSA awards 
CSA awards 
over no 
award 
Wales .864 1.626 .531*** 
Scotland 1.532* 2.197*** .697* 
Mother’s Income Support receipt (no claim)  
On Income Support .483*** .506*** .954 
Mother’s work status (works 30 hours or more)  
16-29 hours 1.097 .691*** 1.588*** 
Less than 16 hours 1.044 1.003 1.041 
No work .678** .561*** 1.209 
Tenure (social tenant):    
Private tenant 1.019 1.028 .991 
Owner Occ. 1.908*** 1.694*** 1.126 
Other 1.700** 1.038 1.638** 
Frequency of contact between non-resident father and children (Daily)  
Weekly 1.242* .740** 1.679*** 
Fortnightly 1.076 .448*** 2.401*** 
Monthly .643** .378*** 1.700*** 
Annually .534*** .261*** 2.044*** 
Less often .171*** .111*** 1.534** 
No contact .061*** .040*** 1.520*** 
Employment of non-resident father (not employed)  
Employed 3.403*** 1.258* 2.706*** 
Status unknown .746** .883 .845 
Length of time since end of last relationship (Less than 12 months)  
1 to 3 years 1.656*** .632*** 2.621*** 
3 to 5 years 1.148 .436*** 2.630*** 
5 to 10 years .832 .254*** 3.276**** 
10 to 15 years .865 .354*** 2.444*** 
15 years or more .512** .294*** 1.739** 
No previous partnership (never 
lived with father) 
.746* .437*** 1.703*** 
 
Reference or contrast categories in parentheses 
Pseudo r-squared 0.20, sample size 8,285. 
Standard errors are adjusted for multiple observations on the same mother 
* .05 < p <.10, ** .01 < p <.05, *** p <.01 
 
Compared to Whites, Black mothers appeared more likely to report having a private 
agreement and less likely to report a CSA award, though neither of these effects were 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Asian mothers were less likely to report 
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having a CSA award than no award, as are mothers from ‘other’ ethnic groups 
(including mixed-race mothers). 
 
Regional variations are found in the types of awards mothers report. The comparisons 
made are relative to the position of mothers in the North East of England. Mothers in 
South West England and Scotland were more likely to report private agreements than 
no award. In London there was no statistically significant difference between having 
no award and a private agreement - these two outcomes were equally likely. However, 
mothers in London were much less to have a CSA award. Compared to the North 
East, CSA awards were also less commonplace in Wales, Yorkshire, the East 
Midlands, the South East of England and Scotland. 
 
Mothers claiming Income Support are equally likely to report a CSA award or no 
award, but much less likely to record having a private agreement. Mothers working 
part-time (16 to 29 hours) are more like to report a CSA award over no award than 
those working full-time.  This, as discussed, might be due to the fact that mothers who 
work part-time are more likely to have previously claimed Income Support and 
thereby had contact with the CSA. Looking specifically at mothers who do not work, 
they are equally likely to report a CSA award or no award – there is no statistically 
significant difference in the risks of these outcomes – but they are much less likely to 
report a private agreement compared to mothers working full-time. Owner occupiers, 
relative to social tenants, were much more likely to record having a private agreement 
than no award as well as more likely to report having a private agreement over CSA 
award. 
 
As with the probit regressions, the relationship between contact and award type is 
complex. Broadly, as contact between a father and his children gets less frequent, with 
the exception of weekly as opposed to daily contact, private agreements become less 
commonplace. Where contact between the father and his children is annual rather than 
daily, the risks of the mother reporting a private agreement as opposed to no award are 
reduced by nearly a half. Where the father has no contact the equivalent risk of a 
private agreement is reduced by 94 per cent. For mothers, any contact less frequent 
than daily raises the relative risk of having a CSA award compared to no award. 
 
These results suggest that fathers’ who have less contact with their children are less 
likely to make private agreements. In such circumstances, all things being equal, CSA 
awards and no agreements are more commonplace. 
 
Where at least one former partner (and father of the mother’s children) is known to be 
in work the relative risks of having a private agreement rather than no award are 
nearly three and half times those where no former partner is known to work. Where 
non-resident fathers are known to work mothers are most likely to record a private 
agreement, then a CSA award, followed by no award. Where the employment status of 
a former partner or partners is unknown, mothers have a reduced risk of reporting a 
private agreement over no award. 
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Finally, the length of time that has elapsed since the couple split is an important 
determinant of the type of award a mother has. Compared to mothers who had split in 
the last 12 months, mothers who had split for between a year and three years had odds 
of having a private agreement compared to no award 1.7 times greater. However, as 
the length of time since separation extends beyond three years there was no 
statistically significant difference in the risk of having a private agreement over no 
award – both were equally likely. Where couples had been separated for 15 years or 
more, the risks of having a private agreement as opposed to no award were about a 
half. As length of time since separation grew, the risks of having a CSA award relative 
to private agreement increased. Among couples for had been separated for more than 
12 months CSA awards, all things being equal, were the most common form of 
arrangement holding other factors constant. 
 
Conclusions 
The regression models show that controlling for the changes in characteristics of 
families eligible for child support, the probabilities of mothers having an award were 
higher in 2004 than they were in 2001. Although there is some evidence that the 
proportion of mothers with CSA awards was greater in 2004 than 2001, most of the 
increase appears to be due to private agreements.  
 
Descriptive statistics reveal that mothers without an award are more disadvantaged 
than other mothers due child support. They are more likely to be out of work, claiming 
Income Support and therefore living on a low income. Mothers who report having 
CSA awards also look relatively disadvantaged but it is families with no award which 
give greatest cause for concern. 
 
The results from the probit regressions were broadly in line with previous findings 
from the US. In Britain, there was no compelling evidence that Blacks were less likely 
to have an award than Whites, though both Asian mothers as well as mothers 
classified as ‘Other’ (including mixed-race mothers) were less likely to report having 
awards. Mothers who had never lived with the non-resident father were less likely to 
have an award, as were those who had lived with a partner but were not married. 
These results are similar to those found in the US. Contrary to the position in the US, 
mothers’ re-partnering appeared to have no effect on award status in Britain; though 
unfortunately information on fathers’ re-partnering was not available.  Furthermore, 
mothers’ educational attainment did not seem particularly important in determining 
award status. 
 
As was the case the US, the regression models reveal that mothers with larger families 
were more likely to have an award. In addition, results showed that mothers working 
part-time are more likely to have an award than those working full-time. Mothers on 
Income Support were less likely to report having an award. 
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Where non-resident fathers were in daily contact with their children, mothers were 
less likely to record having an award compared to where contact was weekly and 
fortnightly. Fathers in daily contact may provide other forms of support which 
mothers possibly prefer to formal arrangements. Alternatively, fathers in daily contact 
may provide higher levels of shared or overnight care and therefore have a greater 
chance of a zero CSA assessment. This in turn again may lead to mothers’ under-
reporting awards. Where contact was less frequent than annual or there was no contact 
the chances of having an award for mothers were much reduced. Finally mothers who 
had recently split from a relationship were less likely to report an award. 
 
The descriptive analyses also reveal that mothers with private agreements appeared to 
be in quite different circumstances to those with CSA awards and those with no 
award. Results from the multinomial logit model confirms this and provided further 
insights. Mothers with private agreements had smaller and younger families. They 
were unsurprisingly less likely to claim Income Support. They were also less likely to 
live in social housing and less likely to be out of work. As contact between fathers and 
their children fell away and as time since separation passed, mothers became less 
likely to report having private agreements. By contrast, mothers with CSA awards 
tended to have larger families and older children, and work part-time rather than full-
time. 
 
Under the current system of child support in Britain, there remain a large number of 
mothers without an award for child support. Many of these mothers have no prospect 
of receiving formal support payments unless their award status changes. They and 
their families are often poor, many are dependent on means-tested benefits such as 
Income Support and they are less likely to work. 
 
Given the high rate of benefit dependency among these women (half were on Income 
Support) and due to assortive mating effects, many have little incentive to pursue an 
award. Under the proposals put forward by Sir David Henshaw and outlined in the 
recent White Paper, child support payments would attract a bigger disregard in the 
calculation of Income Support entitlement; the objective being to create an incentive 
for women to obtain an award and receive payments. However, even with such an 
incentive, it is not clear how many will obtain private agreements. Moreover, women 
may continue to avoid child support arrangements because they may jeopardise 
informal arrangements which they value. Still others may shun the opportunity to 
obtain an award because such a step might encourage unwanted contact. 
 
The CSA has been criticised on many levels. However, as time since separation passes 
awards obtained via the Agency remain ‘on the books’ and binding on the father. The 
evidence presented here suggests that private agreements are less common than CSA 
awards and less common than having no award among mothers who have been 
separated for longer.  
 
As has been established, private agreements are more common where couples have 
recently split, children are younger and the bonds between fathers and their children 
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strong. Where the opposite is the case, relationships have been over for some time, 
children are older and family ties weaker, these results suggest that under the current 
child support system, mothers are less likely to be found with private agreements than 
with other arrangements. 
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